{"title":"心理间、人际间和主体间:对Steven H. Goldberg讨论的回应。","authors":"Stefano Bolognini","doi":"10.1080/00332828.2022.2118505","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I am very grateful to Dr. Steven H. Goldberg for his careful, clear, and profound reading of the text of “From What to How: A Conversation with Stefano Bolognini on Emotional Attunement” and for the appropriate questions he raises. Of course, I am unable to address all his questions in a limited space, and I will restrict myself to focusing on the main problem of the distinction between the interpsychic, the interpersonal, and the intersubjective (which of course would also deserve more space for a detailed theoretical exploration). I am aware that intersubjectivists have also described pre-subjective and co-subjective passages; however, I still consider it useful to try to distinguish even more finely the differences between the different functional levels. Drawing on a historical-etymological perspective, I will mention that for the Etruscans and Romans, sonare, “to sound,” had as its third-person singular form sonat, and iper-sonare had the third-person singular form of iper-sonat, from which the word persona (“person”) derives (as well as from the Etruscan phersu, meaning “mask”). Thus, to hyperproduce a sound was to mask the effect of very strong theatrical characters (i.e., to create a “mask-effect”). Therefore, we can say that a person is primarily an identity concept. Being a person is based on a sufficiently clear definition of the individual’s boundaries and characteristics and on a self-representational distinction from the other, especially at the conscious level. This does not imply constant, integrated contact with one’s subjectivity; indeed, some individuals may have a strong, conscious professional or social identity but a significant lack of contact with the self (certain","PeriodicalId":46869,"journal":{"name":"Psychoanalytic Quarterly","volume":"91 3","pages":"489-494"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Interpsychic, the Interpersonal, and the Intersubjective: Response to Steven H. Goldberg's Discussion.\",\"authors\":\"Stefano Bolognini\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00332828.2022.2118505\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I am very grateful to Dr. Steven H. Goldberg for his careful, clear, and profound reading of the text of “From What to How: A Conversation with Stefano Bolognini on Emotional Attunement” and for the appropriate questions he raises. Of course, I am unable to address all his questions in a limited space, and I will restrict myself to focusing on the main problem of the distinction between the interpsychic, the interpersonal, and the intersubjective (which of course would also deserve more space for a detailed theoretical exploration). I am aware that intersubjectivists have also described pre-subjective and co-subjective passages; however, I still consider it useful to try to distinguish even more finely the differences between the different functional levels. Drawing on a historical-etymological perspective, I will mention that for the Etruscans and Romans, sonare, “to sound,” had as its third-person singular form sonat, and iper-sonare had the third-person singular form of iper-sonat, from which the word persona (“person”) derives (as well as from the Etruscan phersu, meaning “mask”). Thus, to hyperproduce a sound was to mask the effect of very strong theatrical characters (i.e., to create a “mask-effect”). Therefore, we can say that a person is primarily an identity concept. Being a person is based on a sufficiently clear definition of the individual’s boundaries and characteristics and on a self-representational distinction from the other, especially at the conscious level. This does not imply constant, integrated contact with one’s subjectivity; indeed, some individuals may have a strong, conscious professional or social identity but a significant lack of contact with the self (certain\",\"PeriodicalId\":46869,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Psychoanalytic Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"91 3\",\"pages\":\"489-494\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Psychoanalytic Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00332828.2022.2118505\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Psychoanalytic Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00332828.2022.2118505","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Interpsychic, the Interpersonal, and the Intersubjective: Response to Steven H. Goldberg's Discussion.
I am very grateful to Dr. Steven H. Goldberg for his careful, clear, and profound reading of the text of “From What to How: A Conversation with Stefano Bolognini on Emotional Attunement” and for the appropriate questions he raises. Of course, I am unable to address all his questions in a limited space, and I will restrict myself to focusing on the main problem of the distinction between the interpsychic, the interpersonal, and the intersubjective (which of course would also deserve more space for a detailed theoretical exploration). I am aware that intersubjectivists have also described pre-subjective and co-subjective passages; however, I still consider it useful to try to distinguish even more finely the differences between the different functional levels. Drawing on a historical-etymological perspective, I will mention that for the Etruscans and Romans, sonare, “to sound,” had as its third-person singular form sonat, and iper-sonare had the third-person singular form of iper-sonat, from which the word persona (“person”) derives (as well as from the Etruscan phersu, meaning “mask”). Thus, to hyperproduce a sound was to mask the effect of very strong theatrical characters (i.e., to create a “mask-effect”). Therefore, we can say that a person is primarily an identity concept. Being a person is based on a sufficiently clear definition of the individual’s boundaries and characteristics and on a self-representational distinction from the other, especially at the conscious level. This does not imply constant, integrated contact with one’s subjectivity; indeed, some individuals may have a strong, conscious professional or social identity but a significant lack of contact with the self (certain