{"title":"从综合控制论的角度看意识。","authors":"Warren Mansell","doi":"10.1037/rev0000384","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>An integrative account of consciousness should have a number of properties. It should build upon a framework of nonconscious behavior in order to explain how and why consciousness contributes to, and addresses the limitations of, nonconscious processes. It should also encompass the primary (phenomenal), secondary (access), and tertiary (self-awareness) aspects of consciousness. A number of accounts have proposed a role for consciousness in the prediction of sensory input, yet these proposals do not address how organisms deal with multiple, unpredictable, disturbances to maintain control. According to perceptual control theory (PCT), purposiveness is the control of hierarchically organized perceptual variables via changes in output that counteract disturbances which would otherwise increase error between the current value and the reference value (goal state) of each perceptual variable. In PCT, reorganization is the process required for the adaptive modification of control systems in order to reduce the error in intrinsic systems that control essential, largely physiological, variables. The current article proposes that primary consciousness emerges from this system, and is sustained as secondary consciousness through a number of processes including the control of the integration rate of novel information via exploratory behavior, attention, imagination, and altering the mutation rate of reorganization. Tertiary consciousness arises when internally sustained perceptual information is associated with specific symbols that form a parallel, propositional system for the use of language, logic, and other symbolic systems. The hypotheses and initial research designs to test this account are provided. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An integrative control theory perspective on consciousness.\",\"authors\":\"Warren Mansell\",\"doi\":\"10.1037/rev0000384\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>An integrative account of consciousness should have a number of properties. It should build upon a framework of nonconscious behavior in order to explain how and why consciousness contributes to, and addresses the limitations of, nonconscious processes. It should also encompass the primary (phenomenal), secondary (access), and tertiary (self-awareness) aspects of consciousness. A number of accounts have proposed a role for consciousness in the prediction of sensory input, yet these proposals do not address how organisms deal with multiple, unpredictable, disturbances to maintain control. According to perceptual control theory (PCT), purposiveness is the control of hierarchically organized perceptual variables via changes in output that counteract disturbances which would otherwise increase error between the current value and the reference value (goal state) of each perceptual variable. In PCT, reorganization is the process required for the adaptive modification of control systems in order to reduce the error in intrinsic systems that control essential, largely physiological, variables. The current article proposes that primary consciousness emerges from this system, and is sustained as secondary consciousness through a number of processes including the control of the integration rate of novel information via exploratory behavior, attention, imagination, and altering the mutation rate of reorganization. Tertiary consciousness arises when internally sustained perceptual information is associated with specific symbols that form a parallel, propositional system for the use of language, logic, and other symbolic systems. The hypotheses and initial research designs to test this account are provided. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
关于意识的综合论述应该具有一些特性。它应建立在非意识行为的框架之上,以解释意识如何以及为何有助于非意识过程,并解决非意识过程的局限性。它还应该包括意识的初级(现象)、二级(存取)和三级(自我意识)方面。许多观点都提出了意识在预测感觉输入中的作用,但这些观点并没有解决生物如何应对多重、不可预测的干扰以保持控制的问题。根据知觉控制理论(PCT),目的性是通过改变输出来控制分层组织的知觉变量,从而抵消干扰,否则干扰会增加每个知觉变量当前值与参考值(目标状态)之间的误差。在 PCT 中,重组是对控制系统进行适应性修改所需的过程,以减少控制基本变量(主要是生理变量)的内在系统的误差。本文提出,初级意识产生于这一系统,并通过一系列过程(包括通过探索行为控制新信息的整合率、注意力、想象力和改变重组的突变率)作为二级意识得以维持。当内部持续的感知信息与特定符号相关联,形成一个平行的命题系统,用于语言、逻辑和其他符号系统时,三级意识就产生了。本文提供了验证这一观点的假设和初步研究设计。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
An integrative control theory perspective on consciousness.
An integrative account of consciousness should have a number of properties. It should build upon a framework of nonconscious behavior in order to explain how and why consciousness contributes to, and addresses the limitations of, nonconscious processes. It should also encompass the primary (phenomenal), secondary (access), and tertiary (self-awareness) aspects of consciousness. A number of accounts have proposed a role for consciousness in the prediction of sensory input, yet these proposals do not address how organisms deal with multiple, unpredictable, disturbances to maintain control. According to perceptual control theory (PCT), purposiveness is the control of hierarchically organized perceptual variables via changes in output that counteract disturbances which would otherwise increase error between the current value and the reference value (goal state) of each perceptual variable. In PCT, reorganization is the process required for the adaptive modification of control systems in order to reduce the error in intrinsic systems that control essential, largely physiological, variables. The current article proposes that primary consciousness emerges from this system, and is sustained as secondary consciousness through a number of processes including the control of the integration rate of novel information via exploratory behavior, attention, imagination, and altering the mutation rate of reorganization. Tertiary consciousness arises when internally sustained perceptual information is associated with specific symbols that form a parallel, propositional system for the use of language, logic, and other symbolic systems. The hypotheses and initial research designs to test this account are provided. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
Psychological Review publishes articles that make important theoretical contributions to any area of scientific psychology, including systematic evaluation of alternative theories.