{"title":"反驳道格拉斯和埃利奥特。","authors":"Robert Hudson","doi":"10.1007/s10838-022-09616-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In \"Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis\", I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott's advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth.</p>","PeriodicalId":73570,"journal":{"name":"Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie","volume":"53 2","pages":"211-216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9239931/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott.\",\"authors\":\"Robert Hudson\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10838-022-09616-3\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>In \\\"Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis\\\", I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott's advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":73570,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie\",\"volume\":\"53 2\",\"pages\":\"211-216\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9239931/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09616-3\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2022/5/11 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09616-3","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2022/5/11 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在《我们应该努力使科学无偏见吗?对可重复性危机的哲学评估》一文中,我认为如果我们听从希瑟-道格拉斯(Heather Douglas)和凯文-埃利奥特(Kevin C. Elliott)的建议,在科学假说的证据评估中引入非认识论的价值,那么科学中的偏见问题(当前可重复性危机的一个关键因素)就会恶化。道格拉斯和埃利奥特在回应我的论文时,抱怨我歪曲了他们的观点,是各种混淆的受害者。在这篇反驳文章中,我通过对他们发表的观点进行研究,认为我最初对他们工作的解释是准确的,而且在他们手中,科学一般容易偏离真理。
In "Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis", I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott's advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth.