医疗保险市场何时应有纵向选择？

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20201073

Victoria R Marone, Adrienne Sabety

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了在受监管的医疗保险市场中提供承保水平选择--"纵向选择"--的福利效应。我们强调，有效承保水平的异质性不足以促使人们做出选择。当保费不能反映个人成本时，选择其有效承保水平可能不符合消费者的最佳利益。我们的研究表明，只有当付费意愿较高的消费者拥有较高的有效保障水平时，纵向选择才是有效的。我们对这一条件进行了实证研究，发现只要最低承保水平能够得到执行，纵向选择带来的福利收益要么为零，要么在经济上很小。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?

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When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?

We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels-"vertical choice"-in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in efficient coverage level is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums cannot reflect individuals' costs, it may not be in consumers' best interest to select their efficient coverage level. We show that vertical choice is efficient only if consumers with higher willingness-to-pay have a higher efficient level of coverage. We investigate this condition empirically and find that as long as a minimum coverage level can be enforced, the welfare gains from vertical choice are either zero or economically small.

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.