意识和错位的客观性的谬误。

IF 3.1 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-10-15 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1093/nc/niab032
Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P Lang, Andrew M Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Giulio Tononi
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引用次数: 22

摘要

行为、功能和神经的客观关联为意识的科学研究提供了必要的工具。但对这些相关性的依赖不应导致“错位客观性的谬论”:即只有客观属性才能通过科学客观地解释。相反,需要科学地解释的是,经验本质上是什么——它的主观特性,而不仅仅是我们可以从外部对它做什么。必须对此作出解释;否则,体验的感觉将是神奇的,而不是物理的。我们认为,一旦我们超越认知功能,意识到经验是什么以及经验是如何构建的,就有可能客观地解释主观属性。根据综合信息理论,我们展示了主观的客观科学如何严格地用物理术语来解释每一种体验的本质属性和使特定体验产生这种感觉的特定属性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.

Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.

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来源期刊
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Neuroscience of Consciousness Psychology-Clinical Psychology
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
2.40%
发文量
16
审稿时长
19 weeks
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