{"title":"上帝与女孩。","authors":"Benoit Gaultier","doi":"10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p><b>Abstract</b> Imagine you are an agnostic who wants to maximise your chances of getting the right answer to the question whether God exists. I show that theism and atheism are not on an epistemic par with one another because, under certain possible epistemically neutral conditions, the rational thing for you to do from a purely epistemic point of view would be to bet on the atheist's judgement that God doesn't exist rather than on the theist's judgement that God does exist.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"49 3","pages":"999-1005"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"God and the Girl.\",\"authors\":\"Benoit Gaultier\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p><b>Abstract</b> Imagine you are an agnostic who wants to maximise your chances of getting the right answer to the question whether God exists. I show that theism and atheism are not on an epistemic par with one another because, under certain possible epistemically neutral conditions, the rational thing for you to do from a purely epistemic point of view would be to bet on the atheist's judgement that God doesn't exist rather than on the theist's judgement that God does exist.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":74436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"volume\":\"49 3\",\"pages\":\"999-1005\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2020/11/23 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2020/11/23 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Imagine you are an agnostic who wants to maximise your chances of getting the right answer to the question whether God exists. I show that theism and atheism are not on an epistemic par with one another because, under certain possible epistemically neutral conditions, the rational thing for you to do from a purely epistemic point of view would be to bet on the atheist's judgement that God doesn't exist rather than on the theist's judgement that God does exist.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
