{"title":"作为形而上学主体是什么样的?论早期维特根斯坦、我们的认知立场及其以后。","authors":"Konrad Werner","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that \"what is it like\" means primarily \"what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject\".</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"44 3","pages":"921-946"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.\",\"authors\":\"Konrad Werner\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that \\\"what is it like\\\" means primarily \\\"what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject\\\".</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":74436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"volume\":\"44 3\",\"pages\":\"921-946\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2016/2/9 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2016/2/9 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.
I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that "what is it like" means primarily "what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject".