PPOs如何在不违反反垄断法的情况下控制价格?

Hospital progress Pub Date : 1984-03-01
J M Fried
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引用次数: 0

摘要

首选提供者组织(PPOs)引起了关注,因为它们提出了一个问题,即提供者能否在不违反反垄断法的情况下建立控制医疗保健价格的机制。美国最高法院最近在亚利桑那州诉马里科帕县医学会案中裁定,医生组织通过多数投票制定收费表的做法构成了价格操纵,因为“独立竞争的企业家”达成了协议。这一决定意味着,为了避免竞争对手之间的非法协议,ppo必须谨慎地组织集体努力来制定价格。为了避免反垄断风险,医院可以独立确定价格并单独与供应商签订合同,或者他们可以作为个别医生的经纪人,确定费用和索赔处理程序,然后与同意这些要求的医生签订合同。然而,独立设定费用可能很困难,因为医院需要知道医生会接受什么样的报酬。因此,一些医生的介入可能是不可避免的。然而,如果个别医生在信息收集过程中抽样,但不集体设定费用,则不会产生反垄断责任。此外,以合伙关系或其他涉及真正风险分担的联合安排形式构建的PPO应能经受住反垄断挑战。在最近的商业审查信函中,司法部批准了两种不同的PPO结构:美国医院公司的子公司将与供应商、医院和第三方付款人签订(非独家)合同,以折扣价治疗第三方付款人的受益人。收费将与每个医生和医院单独协商。管理咨询公司将充当提供者和第三方付款人之间的中介,协商患者折扣,但不参与费用设定。PPO不需要像这些项目那样在每个方面都有组织。具体情况各不相同,有了合理的反垄断建议,私人收购公司可以避免法律陷阱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How can PPOs control prices without violating antitrust laws?

Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have caused concern because they raise the question whether providers can establish mechanisms to control the price of medical care without violating antitrust laws. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society that the practices of a physicians' organization which set fee schedules by majority vote constituted price fixing because "independent competing entrepreneurs" made the agreements. The decision implies that PPOs must carefully structure collective efforts to set prices in order to avoid unlawful agreement among competitors. To avoid antitrust exposure, hospitals may independently determine prices and contract individually with providers, or they may act as brokers for individual physicians, establishing fees and claims-processing procedures and then contracting with physicians who agree to these requirements. Setting fees independently may be difficult, however, since hospitals need to know what payment physicians will accept. Thus some physician involvement is probably inevitable. No antitrust liability results, however, if individual physicians are sampled in an information-gathering process but do not collectively set fees. In addition, a PPO that is structured as a partnership or other joint arrangement involving true risk sharing should withstand antitrust challenge. In recent business review letters, the Department of Justice approved two different PPO structures: A Hospital Corporation of America subsidiary would contract (nonexclusively) with providers, hospitals, and third party payers to treat the third party payers' beneficiaries at discounted rates. The charges would be negotiated individually with each physician and hospital. A management consultant firm would act as an intermediary between providers and third party payers, negotiating patient discounts but not participating in fee setting. A PPO need not be structured in every respect like these programs. Individual situations vary, and with sound antitrust advice, PPOs can avoid legal pitfalls.

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