功能封地,贫穷模式还是个人主义?发展卫生规划方面的政府间关系

David C. Colby
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摘要

根据1974年的《国家卫生计划和发展法案》,美国国家政府有权建立并行使对卫生系统机构、州卫生计划和发展机构以及州卫生协调委员会系统的法律控制。虽然国家政府似乎拥有指导和控制卫生计划过程所必需的法律权力,但联邦制度在实施具有集中目标或方向的计划方面存在困难。各州和地区有可能削弱中央政府的力量。讨论了国家、州和地区卫生规划单位之间关系发展的三种趋势。第一种是职能领域,由自我延续的、目的狭窄的机构组成,这些机构不对地方或全州的民选官员负责。这些是专业的官僚机构,他们与支持他们的利益集团建立并加强了舒适的关系。第二种趋势,即贫困模式,包括缺乏地方民选官员的控制,非政府行为体发挥很大作用,以及华盛顿与地区规划机构之间的直接关系。最后一个趋势似乎是个人主义的,每个单位都在自谋生路。本文以马萨诸塞州的案例研究以及其他州的补充材料来说明这一趋势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Functional fiefdom, poverty model or individualism? Development of intergovernmental relations in health planning

The United States national government has the power under the National Health Planning and Development Act of 1974 to establish and exercise legal control over a system of Health System Agencies, State Health Planning and Development Agencies, and State Health Coordinating Councils. Although the national government appears to have the legal powers necessary to direct and control the health planning process, a federal system has difficulties in the implementation of planning which has centralized goals or direction. The states and regions have the potential power to weaken the strength of the national government. Three trends in the developing relationship between the national, state, and regional units in health planning are discussed. The first, the functional fiefdom, consists of self-perpetuating, narrow purpose agencies which are not responsible to local or state-wide elected officials. These are professional bureaucracies which create and reinforce cozy relationships with supportive interest groups. The second trend, the poverty model, includes the lack of control by local elected officials, a large role to nongovernmental actors, and a direct relationship between Washington and the regional planning agencies. The last trend appears to be an individualistic one with every unit fending for itself. A case study of Massachusetts along with supplemental materials from other states is presented to illustrate the trends.

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