行为代币经济学：短视投票和代币加权治理

IF 2 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-10 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113303

Nicole Tsz Yeung Liu, Samuel N. Kirshner, Eric T.K. Lim

{"title":"行为代币经济学：短视投票和代币加权治理","authors":"Nicole Tsz Yeung Liu, Samuel N. Kirshner, Eric T.K. Lim","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113303","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Crowdsourcing-based decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) often aggregate members’ information and beliefs through token-weighted voting. Existing research shows that token-weighted voting erodes information aggregation when members vote myopically, whereas strategic members adjust the weight on their private signals inversely to their token holdings to unravel the weighting mechanism. We test voters’ behavior in a controlled experiment, finding that participants vote myopically, conservatively weighting their private signals, and that the voting mechanism does not influence their propensity to act strategically. Our results provide an important first step in developing a behavioral understanding of DAOs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113303"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Behavioral tokenomics: Myopic voting and token-weighted governance\",\"authors\":\"Nicole Tsz Yeung Liu, Samuel N. Kirshner, Eric T.K. Lim\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113303\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Crowdsourcing-based decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) often aggregate members’ information and beliefs through token-weighted voting. Existing research shows that token-weighted voting erodes information aggregation when members vote myopically, whereas strategic members adjust the weight on their private signals inversely to their token holdings to unravel the weighting mechanism. We test voters’ behavior in a controlled experiment, finding that participants vote myopically, conservatively weighting their private signals, and that the voting mechanism does not influence their propensity to act strategically. Our results provide an important first step in developing a behavioral understanding of DAOs.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11468,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics Letters\",\"volume\":\"269 \",\"pages\":\"Article 113303\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2026-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176526004994\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2026/10/10 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176526004994","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/10/10 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

基于众包的去中心化自治组织（dao）通常通过令牌加权投票来聚合成员的信息和信念。现有研究表明，当成员短视投票时，代币加权投票会破坏信息聚集，而战略成员则会根据其持有的代币反向调整其私人信号的权重，从而破坏加权机制。我们在一个对照实验中测试了选民的行为，发现参与者的投票是短视的，保守地权衡他们的私人信号，投票机制并不影响他们采取战略行动的倾向。我们的结果为开发对dao的行为理解提供了重要的第一步。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Behavioral tokenomics: Myopic voting and token-weighted governance

Crowdsourcing-based decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) often aggregate members’ information and beliefs through token-weighted voting. Existing research shows that token-weighted voting erodes information aggregation when members vote myopically, whereas strategic members adjust the weight on their private signals inversely to their token holdings to unravel the weighting mechanism. We test voters’ behavior in a controlled experiment, finding that participants vote myopically, conservatively weighting their private signals, and that the voting mechanism does not influence their propensity to act strategically. Our results provide an important first step in developing a behavioral understanding of DAOs.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.