责任投资的外部性

IF 12.2 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
MICHELE BISCEGLIA, ALESSIO PICCOLO, JAN SCHNEEMEIER
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们建立了一个模型来研究社会责任投资(SRI)作为控制企业外部性的机制的效率。当SRI不太受欢迎时,负责任的投资者倾向于将SRI集中在经济中的一小部分公司中的策略。这种集中可以缓解采用绿色技术的协调问题,但它也可能排挤被排除在外的企业的绿色投资,并提高绿色产品的价格。在均衡中,负责任的投资者即使在SRI变得更受欢迎的时候也会继续倾向于集中,并且在集中最不可取的时候集中最多。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Externalities of Responsible Investments
We develop a model to study the efficiency of socially responsible investing (SRI) as a mechanism to control firms' externalities. When SRI is not too popular, responsible investors favor strategies that lead to a concentration of SRI in a subset of firms in the economy. This concentration can mitigate coordination issues in adopting green technologies, but it can also crowd out the green investments of excluded firms and increase the price of green products. In equilibrium, responsible investors continue to favor concentration even as SRI becomes more popular, and concentrate the most when concentration is least desirable.
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来源期刊
Journal of Finance
Journal of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
88
期刊介绍: The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.
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