预算盈余的分割：走向私有信息下离散公共产品的次优机制

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-15 DOI:10.1111/jpet.70121

Licun Xue

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出并研究了以下机制：主体同时做出贡献。出资总额低于成本的，退还出资；否则，公共产品就会被提供，预算盈余（如果有的话）将在代理人之间平均分享。我们的机制减轻了在“认购机制”中贡献不足的激励，在“认购机制”中，预算盈余由机制设计者保留。我们确定了在所有激励相容、个体理性和预算平衡的贝叶斯机制中，我们的机制达到最大总预期收益的条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information

We propose and study the following mechanism: Agents simultaneously make contributions. If the total contribution is below the cost, contributions are refunded; otherwise the public good is provided and budget surplus, if there is any, is shared equally among the agents. Our mechanism mitigates the incentive to under-contribute in the well-studied “subscription mechanism” where budget surplus is retained by the mechanism designer. We identify conditions under which our mechanism achieves the maximal total expected gain among all Bayesian mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced.

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

自引率

36.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.