Logics of (dis)engagement: mapping variation in non-government norms and approaches to alcohol, ultra-processed food and related industries - a case study from Australia.

BACKGROUND: A central question in contemporary health governance is how to prevent undue corporate influence. There is limited practical guidance beyond the tobacco control model. Global partnership approaches have continued to promote alcohol and ultra-processed food (UPF) industry engagement, and these industries have influenced policy and governance in ways that benefit their interests, often to the detriment of strong health regulation. In Australia industry influence has delayed the introduction of mandatory alcohol health warning labels and ensured voluntary rather than mandatory front of pack food labelling. This qualitative study is the first to our knowledge to map underlying institutional logics shaping variation in the interactions of NGOs who are not reliant on industry core funding with alcohol, UPF and related industries. RESULTS: Drawing on thirty interviews with senior policy and advocacy staff from nongovernment organisations active in alcohol and/or UPF advocacy in Australia, we find shared opposition to partnerships with the alcohol industry and significant variation towards approaches to interactions with the UPF industry. All interviewees spoke of challenges in delineating the interests of other industries that may work with alcohol and UPF, such as supermarkets and retailers, advertising agencies and public relation firms, and banks and investment entities. We identify four institutional logics for disengagement with alcohol and UPF industries: a logic of reputational risk, a logic of delegitimation, an FCTC logic, and a logic of competing interests. In contrast, we find two logics for limited engagement with alcohol and UPF industries: a logic of intelligence gathering, and a logic of ‘acting reasonable’. Finally, we identify two logics for engagement with a wider range of industries: a logic of partnership and a logic of revenue raising. Only a small number of organisations had formal written policies on conflicts of interest. CONCLUSIONS: We find that many organisations have conflicting internal logics creating challenges for organisational coherence. The development of internal risk assessments by some organisations indicate efforts by staff to prevent undue corporate influence. We recommend greater transparency of policies by NGOs on preventing corporate influence, preventing conflicts of interest, and approaches to engaging a variety of corporate actors, and the establishment of a global community of practice for sharing innovative tools and approaches to preventing undue corporate influence.