在模糊中会发生什么

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-10-04 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107162

Maxim Massenkoff , Peter DeScioli , Kyle Thomas , Steven Pinker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么人们在提出非法交易时语无伦次？我们考察了模糊语的策略运用。参与者玩一个经济游戏，在这个游戏中，策划者和同伙可以协调从目标那里取钱。当一个警察在监视时，阴谋家更有可能向帮凶发出一个模糊的信息（“有些事情还是不说为好”），而这个信息通常会招募帮凶来串通。在实验2中，策划者可以编写他们自己的消息。当警察在监视时，他们写的信息更加模糊，这再次有效地招募了帮凶。

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What happens in vagueness

Why do people speak vaguely when they propose illicit deals? We examine the strategic use of vague speech. Participants play an economic game in which a schemer and accomplice can coordinate to take money from a mark. When a cop was watching, the schemer was more likely to send a vague message (“Some things are better left unsaid”) to the accomplice, which usually recruited the accomplice to collude. In Experiment 2, the schemer could write their own message. When the cop was watching, they wrote messages that were more vague, which again recruited the accomplice effectively.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.