Yong-Heng Shi , Tao Zhao , Bai-Chen Xie , Peng Hao
{"title":"导航不确定发电:监管对分布式光伏绿色电力交易市场参与的影响","authors":"Yong-Heng Shi , Tao Zhao , Bai-Chen Xie , Peng Hao","doi":"10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108925","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Distributed photovoltaic systems play increasingly important roles in the power mix. China is actively promoting the integration of aggregated photovoltaics into the green electricity trading market. However, challenges related to undersupply and oversupply, stemming from uncertain generation, hinder market integration. To address these issues, China has implemented alternative regulatory mechanisms designed to guide generation schedules and mitigate forecasting deviations. It remains to be seen how these mechanisms will promote economic benefits and social welfare. This paper proposes a bi-level differential game model to investigate the effects of three mechanisms: fixed penalties, flexible penalties, and nearby consumption. The results show that: (i) Imposing or increasing undersupply penalties results in a strictly low renewable energy commitment, and distributed energy aggregation can mitigate this detrimental effect; (ii) Reducing the penalty intensity improves social welfare and a moderate fixed penalty helps to increase profits for generators; (iii) Generators can strategically increase their renewable energy commitment to manipulate the penalty under a market-based flexible penalty mechanism; (iv) Generators benefit from the resale of excess generation in a secondary market, but this practice may lead to a loss of social welfare when facing high levelized costs. In addition to cost reductions, a combination of punishment and nearby consumption can be applied to cope with generation uncertainty.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11665,"journal":{"name":"Energy Economics","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 108925"},"PeriodicalIF":14.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Navigating uncertain generation: The impact of regulation on distributed photovoltaic green electricity trading market participation\",\"authors\":\"Yong-Heng Shi , Tao Zhao , Bai-Chen Xie , Peng Hao\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108925\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Distributed photovoltaic systems play increasingly important roles in the power mix. China is actively promoting the integration of aggregated photovoltaics into the green electricity trading market. However, challenges related to undersupply and oversupply, stemming from uncertain generation, hinder market integration. To address these issues, China has implemented alternative regulatory mechanisms designed to guide generation schedules and mitigate forecasting deviations. It remains to be seen how these mechanisms will promote economic benefits and social welfare. This paper proposes a bi-level differential game model to investigate the effects of three mechanisms: fixed penalties, flexible penalties, and nearby consumption. The results show that: (i) Imposing or increasing undersupply penalties results in a strictly low renewable energy commitment, and distributed energy aggregation can mitigate this detrimental effect; (ii) Reducing the penalty intensity improves social welfare and a moderate fixed penalty helps to increase profits for generators; (iii) Generators can strategically increase their renewable energy commitment to manipulate the penalty under a market-based flexible penalty mechanism; (iv) Generators benefit from the resale of excess generation in a secondary market, but this practice may lead to a loss of social welfare when facing high levelized costs. In addition to cost reductions, a combination of punishment and nearby consumption can be applied to cope with generation uncertainty.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11665,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Energy Economics\",\"volume\":\"151 \",\"pages\":\"Article 108925\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":14.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-09-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Energy Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988325007522\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Energy Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988325007522","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Navigating uncertain generation: The impact of regulation on distributed photovoltaic green electricity trading market participation
Distributed photovoltaic systems play increasingly important roles in the power mix. China is actively promoting the integration of aggregated photovoltaics into the green electricity trading market. However, challenges related to undersupply and oversupply, stemming from uncertain generation, hinder market integration. To address these issues, China has implemented alternative regulatory mechanisms designed to guide generation schedules and mitigate forecasting deviations. It remains to be seen how these mechanisms will promote economic benefits and social welfare. This paper proposes a bi-level differential game model to investigate the effects of three mechanisms: fixed penalties, flexible penalties, and nearby consumption. The results show that: (i) Imposing or increasing undersupply penalties results in a strictly low renewable energy commitment, and distributed energy aggregation can mitigate this detrimental effect; (ii) Reducing the penalty intensity improves social welfare and a moderate fixed penalty helps to increase profits for generators; (iii) Generators can strategically increase their renewable energy commitment to manipulate the penalty under a market-based flexible penalty mechanism; (iv) Generators benefit from the resale of excess generation in a secondary market, but this practice may lead to a loss of social welfare when facing high levelized costs. In addition to cost reductions, a combination of punishment and nearby consumption can be applied to cope with generation uncertainty.
期刊介绍:
Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.