Evolutionary dynamics of information diffusion with sending-receiving interactions

In this paper, we systematically investigate the evolutionary dynamics of information diffusion with sending and receiving interactions in both well-mixed and structured populations. We propose an evolutionary game-theoretical model that captures the dual roles of individuals as both senders and receivers, examining not only the strategies of individuals as senders (to send or not to send) but also their strategies as receivers (to accept or deny). By using replicator dynamics, we find that there exists a stable coexistence state between the strategies of “not sending-accepting” and “not sending-denying” in well-mixed populations, with the “sending-accepting” strategy failing to emerge. Furthermore, we theoretically demonstrate that the stable coexistence state is robust against parameter variations. However, in structured populations, we derive a critical mathematical condition under which the emergence of the “sending-accepting” strategy is promoted. This finding highlights the importance of population structure in facilitating efficient information dissemination. Besides, to validate our theoretical results, we conduct computer simulations. All simulation outcomes are in agreement with the theoretical predictions.