配置信息设计，验证成本高

IF 1.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI:10.1111/iere.12754

Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究了具有验证成本的单代理分配问题中的信息设计问题，其中主体具有正保留值。代理从信息设计者控制的分布中私下学习到一个关于委托人分配值的信号。在给定信号分布的情况下，委托人设计了一种使其净值最大化的机制。我们证明了代理最优信息在一个值得验证的信号处汇集了高值，而委托人最优信息具有完全披露的特征。此外，任何代理人的最优信息都是委托人的最坏信息，尽管他们的利益部分一致且没有转移。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION

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INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION

We study information design in a single-agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent-optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal-optimal information features full disclosure. Moreover, any agent-optimal information is principal-worst, despite their partially aligned interests and the absence of transfers.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.