Frederico S Duque Estrada Meyer, Leandro Antunes Mariosi
{"title":"设计生存:生物武器公约在50岁时对分解的生物安全生态系统的自创生反应。","authors":"Frederico S Duque Estrada Meyer, Leandro Antunes Mariosi","doi":"10.1177/23265094251381803","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Marking the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), this commentary examines adaptive strategies underpinning the treaty's resilience within an increasingly complex and fragmented global biosecurity ecosystem. By conceptualizing the BWC as an autopoietic subsystem-one that is self-sustaining and yet structurally coupled to its environment-we argue that the BWC's historical effectiveness in preventing large-scale biological weapons use derives from its capacity for normative memory. Its reflexive operation enables the treaty to continuously reinterpret and apply its foundational prohibition amid evolving scientific and technological landscapes. Recent advancements in synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and artificial intelligence intensify risks by blurring boundaries between biosafety and biosecurity, between peaceful and weaponized biotechnology applications, challenging the BWC's ability to differentiate clearly between permissible and prohibited activities. In response, internal structural differentiation through specialized frameworks becomes essential, notably via the proposed science and technology mechanism. This body would function explicitly as a structural coupling device, mediating uncertainty and translating the flux of scientific possibility into legally referable categories without collapsing the normative autonomy of the Convention. Concurrently, the international cooperation and assistance mechanism would enhance global preparedness and interoperability among cross-disciplinary biosecurity communities. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the urgency for institutional adaptability, heightened preparedness, and proactive engagement across disciplines. Analyzing ongoing diplomatic negotiations within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, we highlight substantial convergences alongside residual divergences across 7 key topics: international cooperation and assistance; science and technology; compliance and verification; confidence-building measures; assistance, response and preparedness; national implementation; and organizational, institutional, and financial arrangements. Ultimately, we advocate for integration of scientific expertise and diplomatic practice, emphasizing sustained interdisciplinary collaboration and robust institutional commitment as prerequisites for ensuring the BWC's normative vitality and operational efficacy for decades to come.</p>","PeriodicalId":12955,"journal":{"name":"Health Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Survival by Design: The BWC's Autopoietic Response at Fifty to a Disaggregated Biosecurity Ecosystem.\",\"authors\":\"Frederico S Duque Estrada Meyer, Leandro Antunes Mariosi\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/23265094251381803\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Marking the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), this commentary examines adaptive strategies underpinning the treaty's resilience within an increasingly complex and fragmented global biosecurity ecosystem. By conceptualizing the BWC as an autopoietic subsystem-one that is self-sustaining and yet structurally coupled to its environment-we argue that the BWC's historical effectiveness in preventing large-scale biological weapons use derives from its capacity for normative memory. Its reflexive operation enables the treaty to continuously reinterpret and apply its foundational prohibition amid evolving scientific and technological landscapes. Recent advancements in synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and artificial intelligence intensify risks by blurring boundaries between biosafety and biosecurity, between peaceful and weaponized biotechnology applications, challenging the BWC's ability to differentiate clearly between permissible and prohibited activities. In response, internal structural differentiation through specialized frameworks becomes essential, notably via the proposed science and technology mechanism. This body would function explicitly as a structural coupling device, mediating uncertainty and translating the flux of scientific possibility into legally referable categories without collapsing the normative autonomy of the Convention. Concurrently, the international cooperation and assistance mechanism would enhance global preparedness and interoperability among cross-disciplinary biosecurity communities. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the urgency for institutional adaptability, heightened preparedness, and proactive engagement across disciplines. Analyzing ongoing diplomatic negotiations within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, we highlight substantial convergences alongside residual divergences across 7 key topics: international cooperation and assistance; science and technology; compliance and verification; confidence-building measures; assistance, response and preparedness; national implementation; and organizational, institutional, and financial arrangements. Ultimately, we advocate for integration of scientific expertise and diplomatic practice, emphasizing sustained interdisciplinary collaboration and robust institutional commitment as prerequisites for ensuring the BWC's normative vitality and operational efficacy for decades to come.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":12955,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Health Security\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-10-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Health Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/23265094251381803\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"医学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Health Security","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/23265094251381803","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH","Score":null,"Total":0}
Survival by Design: The BWC's Autopoietic Response at Fifty to a Disaggregated Biosecurity Ecosystem.
Marking the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), this commentary examines adaptive strategies underpinning the treaty's resilience within an increasingly complex and fragmented global biosecurity ecosystem. By conceptualizing the BWC as an autopoietic subsystem-one that is self-sustaining and yet structurally coupled to its environment-we argue that the BWC's historical effectiveness in preventing large-scale biological weapons use derives from its capacity for normative memory. Its reflexive operation enables the treaty to continuously reinterpret and apply its foundational prohibition amid evolving scientific and technological landscapes. Recent advancements in synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and artificial intelligence intensify risks by blurring boundaries between biosafety and biosecurity, between peaceful and weaponized biotechnology applications, challenging the BWC's ability to differentiate clearly between permissible and prohibited activities. In response, internal structural differentiation through specialized frameworks becomes essential, notably via the proposed science and technology mechanism. This body would function explicitly as a structural coupling device, mediating uncertainty and translating the flux of scientific possibility into legally referable categories without collapsing the normative autonomy of the Convention. Concurrently, the international cooperation and assistance mechanism would enhance global preparedness and interoperability among cross-disciplinary biosecurity communities. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the urgency for institutional adaptability, heightened preparedness, and proactive engagement across disciplines. Analyzing ongoing diplomatic negotiations within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, we highlight substantial convergences alongside residual divergences across 7 key topics: international cooperation and assistance; science and technology; compliance and verification; confidence-building measures; assistance, response and preparedness; national implementation; and organizational, institutional, and financial arrangements. Ultimately, we advocate for integration of scientific expertise and diplomatic practice, emphasizing sustained interdisciplinary collaboration and robust institutional commitment as prerequisites for ensuring the BWC's normative vitality and operational efficacy for decades to come.
期刊介绍:
Health Security is a peer-reviewed journal providing research and essential guidance for the protection of people’s health before and after epidemics or disasters and for ensuring that communities are resilient to major challenges. The Journal explores the issues posed by disease outbreaks and epidemics; natural disasters; biological, chemical, and nuclear accidents or deliberate threats; foodborne outbreaks; and other health emergencies. It offers important insight into how to develop the systems needed to meet these challenges. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Health Security covers research, innovations, methods, challenges, and ethical and legal dilemmas facing scientific, military, and health organizations. The Journal is a key resource for practitioners in these fields, policymakers, scientific experts, and government officials.