多市场联系，卡特尔和产品质量

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102467

Neelanjan Sen , Uday Bhanu Sinha

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们展示了多市场接触如何对两个不同市场的质量选择产生负面影响，导致高质量产品的可用性减少，低质量产品的可用性增加。在我们的模型中，企业在不同市场的质量选择中可能存在串通行为，并且可能在产品质量改进方面投资不足。我们还讨论了这类卡特尔的稳定性。如果两家公司串通，使得其中一家或两家公司在一个或两个市场上转向低质量的产品，消费者剩余就会减少。然而，在这样做的过程中，公司在勾结下获得了更高的利润。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Multimarket contact, cartel and product quality

We demonstrate how multimarket contact can negatively impact the quality choices in two different markets, resulting in a reduction in the availability of high-quality products and an increase in the availability of low-quality products. In our model, the firms can collude during the quality choice in different markets and may under-invest in product quality improvement. We also discuss the stability of these types of cartels. Consumer surplus decreases if both firms collude, such that either or both firms switch to the low-quality product in one or both markets. However, in doing so, the firms earn higher profits under collusion.

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.