独立董事的政治关系与CEO薪酬：来自中国的证据

IF 5.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

International Review of Economics & Finance Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI:10.1016/j.iref.2025.104653

Yaohua Qin , He Xiao , Jinwen Lin , Luning Song

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了2009 - 2018年中国上市公司独立董事政治关系与首席执行官薪酬的关系。实证分析表明，有政治关系的独立董事显著降低了CEO薪酬过高。渠道测试表明，这种效应源于pcid相对于ceo的谈判能力增强。在CEO有政治关系的公司中，pcid与CEO薪酬之间的负相关减弱，但在受益于大量优惠银行贷款和政府补贴的公司中，pcid与CEO薪酬之间的负相关放大。异质性分析进一步表明，这种负向关系在公司治理机制较强的企业和国有企业中减弱，而在由经验丰富和有才能的ceo领导的企业中增强。我们的结果在一系列内生性检查和替代规范中保持稳健。

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Independent directors’ political connections and CEO compensation: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between independent directors' political connections and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2018. Our empirical analysis reveals that politically connected independent directors (PCIDs) significantly reduce excessive CEO compensation. Channel tests demonstrate that this effect stems from PCIDs’ enhanced negotiation power relative to CEOs. The negative association between PCIDs and CEO compensation is attenuated in firms with politically connected CEOs but amplified in firms benefiting from substantial preferential bank loans and government subsidies. Heterogeneity analysis further shows that this negative relationship weakens in firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while intensifying among firms led by experienced and talented CEOs. Our results remain robust across a battery of endogeneity checks and alternative specifications.

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来源期刊

International Review of Economics & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

2.20%

发文量

253

期刊介绍： The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.