Doubts about Dutilitarianism

Peterson presents a new hybrid ethical theory in his paper “Dutilitarianism.” As the name suggests, the theory is a mixture of Utilitarianism and Duty ethics. Its main motivation is that it will improve on both. In my commentary, I raise some doubts about this idea. One problem is that Dutilitarianism will not have morally acceptable implications: it will classify some wrong acts as right. Another problem is that it cannot provide any plausible explanation for its verdicts: a believable combination of utilitarian and Kantian explanations for why right acts are right does not seem to fit dutilitarian verdicts. A third problem is that the formula that Peterson suggests for calculating dutilitarian degrees of rightness is unhelpful: it cannot be used to compare acts that are partly right in different ways. A fourth problem is that Dutilitarianism is needlessly complex: it uses degrees of rightness, rather than the standard binary rightness, but this invention neither reflects the potential complexities of rightness grounds nor helps us decide what to do.