评估公私海水淡化企业战略互动的博弈论框架：以智利为例

IF 4.4 3区经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS

Utilities Policy Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI:10.1016/j.jup.2025.102041

Rodrigo A. Cáceres González , Eduardo Zúñiga Leyton

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文发展了一个博弈论模型来分析公共和私营海水淡化公司的战略行为，并受到智利背景的激励。在双寡头环境下，我们研究了在政府通过补贴和生产要求的影响下，这些公司如何在住宅和采矿部门之间分配水。该分析探讨了公共生产的份额和工厂效率的差异如何影响均衡结果。结果表明，住宅需求和采矿业需求之间的巨大体积差异是均衡战略行为的关键驱动因素。该模型使用来自智利科金博地区的真实数据进行校准。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A game-theoretic framework to evaluate the strategic interaction of public and private desalination firms: A case study from Chile

This article develops a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of public and private desalination firms, motivated by the Chilean context. In a duopoly setting, we examine how these firms allocate water between residential and mining sectors, under government influence through subsidies and production requirements. The analysis explores how the share of public production and differences in plant efficiency affect equilibrium outcomes. Results show that the substantial volumetric difference between residential and mining demand is a key driver of equilibrium strategic behavior. The model is calibrated using real data from the Coquimbo region in Chile.

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来源期刊

Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

CiteScore

6.80

自引率

10.00%

发文量

审稿时长

66 days

期刊介绍： Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.