Diffusion of CCUS technology under dual drivers: Regulatory pressure and carbon source investments

Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) technology is vital for achieving carbon neutrality. Its diffusion is shaped by government regulation and the adoption willingness of coal-fired power plants. However, weak regulation and insufficient economic incentives limit large-scale deployment, and the diffusion mechanisms remain unclear. This study constructs an evolutionary game-SEIR model integrating government, carbon source, and carbon sink enterprises, combining epidemic dynamics and evolutionary game theory. First, we build an evolutionary game model to analyze the interactions between government regulation and coal-fired power plants’ emission reduction strategies. Second, we use an SEIR model to quantify how equilibrium outcomes influence CCUS diffusion among enterprises. Finally, we simulate four typical scenarios. Results show: (1) Under dual cost constraints, both government regulation and emission reduction strategies exhibit negative convergence, with passive tax payment probability reaching 68.7%. (2) The system’s evolution depends strongly on initial conditions, and government intervention must meet critical thresholds; simulations indicate that when the carbon price exceeds 420 RMB/ton, diffusion rates increase by 3.2 times. (3) Under single regulation, technology adoption is 17.3%, while combined regulation-incentive policies raise adoption to 82.6%. This study offers new theoretical insights and policy recommendations for balancing energy security and carbon emission reduction.