在任者在混合成员选举制度中的影响

IF 2.3 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
B.K. Song
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中,我通过研究混合成员制度,证明在任优势可能因不同原因在选举制度中产生。我从回归不连续设计中得出的结果表明,选区和比例代表制(PR)两层都存在任职优势。此外,我提供的证据表明,不同的机制支撑着这些优势:在争夺地区席位时,政党战略性地为来自两个阶层的现任者分配有利的选票位置,但这种政党驱动的优势在公关现任者身上更为明显。相比之下,选民支持机制主要支持地区现任官员。最后,我证明了这种任职优势对两个阶层来说都是短暂的,这意味着在韩国的混合成员制度中,初级政治职位不一定是职业政治家的跳板。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The effect of incumbency in a mixed-member electoral system
In this study, I demonstrate that incumbency advantage can arise for different reasons across electoral systems by examining a mixed-member system. My findings from a regression discontinuity design indicate that an incumbency advantage exists in both district and proportional representation (PR) tiers. Additionally, I provide evidence that distinct mechanisms underpin these advantages: parties strategically assign favorable ballot positions to incumbents from both tiers when competing for district seats, but this party-driven advantage is more pronounced for PR incumbents. By contrast, voter support mechanisms mainly favor district incumbents. Finally, I demonstrate that this incumbency advantage is short-lived for both tiers, which implies that an entry-level political office does not necessarily serve as a springboard for career politicians in the South Korean mixed-member system.
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来源期刊
Electoral Studies
Electoral Studies POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
13.00%
发文量
82
审稿时长
67 days
期刊介绍: Electoral Studies is an international journal covering all aspects of voting, the central act in the democratic process. Political scientists, economists, sociologists, game theorists, geographers, contemporary historians and lawyers have common, and overlapping, interests in what causes voters to act as they do, and the consequences. Electoral Studies provides a forum for these diverse approaches. It publishes fully refereed papers, both theoretical and empirical, on such topics as relationships between votes and seats, and between election outcomes and politicians reactions; historical, sociological, or geographical correlates of voting behaviour; rational choice analysis of political acts, and critiques of such analyses.
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