A signaling theory of self-handicapping

People use various strategies to bolster the perception of their competence. One strategy is self-handicapping, by which people deliberately impede their performance in order to protect or enhance perceived competence. Despite much prior research, it is unclear why, when, and how self-handicapping occurs. We develop a formal theory that chooses the optimal degree of self-handicapping based on its anticipated performance and signaling effects. We test the theory’s predictions in two experiments ($N=400$), showing that self-handicapping occurs more often when it is unlikely to affect the outcome and when it increases the perceived competence in the eyes of a naive observer. With sophisticated observers (who consider whether a person chooses to self-handicap), self-handicapping is less effective when followed by failure. We show that the theory also explains the findings of several past studies. By offering a systematic explanation of self-handicapping, the theory lays the groundwork for developing effective interventions.