鼓励团队合作,促进可持续发展

IF 9.1 1区 综合性期刊 Q1 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES
Kathleen Segerson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在各种情况下,“投入”解决环境或资源管理问题可能受益于个人或公司不仅单独工作,而且作为一个团队共同合作。例子包括共同努力促进保育或生境保护,分享信息,或开发污染较少的产品或生产工艺。然而,迄今为止,有关环境政策的文献只考虑了个别当事方(如公司、土地所有者或个人)采取措施(即施加“努力”)减少污染或满足资源管理目标的激励,这些步骤影响到该当事方自己的环境足迹或绩效。文献中没有考虑到一方从事活动的能力,而不是帮助另一方提高后者的表现。这种帮助既可以替代自己的努力,也可以补充自己的努力。本文提出的分析表明,基于个人表现的传统政策方法通常不能有效地激励努力和帮助,但(适当设计的)基于群体表现的奖励或惩罚的集体方法可以。这表明使用集体方法作为促进可持续性的潜在重要工具的另一个理由在文献中尚未得到承认。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Incentivizing teamwork to promote sustainability
There are a variety of contexts in which “pitching in” to address environmental or resource management problems could benefit from individuals or firms working not just on their own but also working together collaboratively as a group. Examples include working together on promoting conservation or habitat protection, the sharing of information, or the development of less polluting products or production processes. However, to date, the literature on environmental policy has considered only the incentives for individual parties (e.g., firms, landowners, or individuals) to take steps (i.e., exert “effort”) to reduce pollution or meet resource management goals where those steps impact that party’s own environmental footprint or performance. Missing from the literature is any consideration of the ability of one party to undertake activities that instead help another improve the latter’s performance. Such help could be either a substitute for or a complement to one’s own effort. This paper presents an analysis showing that traditional policy approaches based on individual performance cannot generally efficiently incentivize both effort and help, but a (properly designed) collective approach where rewards or punishments are based on group performance can. This suggests an additional rationale for the use of collective approaches as a potentially important tool for promoting sustainability that has not been recognized in the literature.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
19.00
自引率
0.90%
发文量
3575
审稿时长
2.5 months
期刊介绍: The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), a peer-reviewed journal of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), serves as an authoritative source for high-impact, original research across the biological, physical, and social sciences. With a global scope, the journal welcomes submissions from researchers worldwide, making it an inclusive platform for advancing scientific knowledge.
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