{"title":"基于蒙特卡罗树搜索和确定的不完全信息同步升拍的高效竞价","authors":"Alexandre Pacaud;Aurelien Bechler;Marceau Coupechoux","doi":"10.1109/TG.2025.3552025","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we tackle the problem of designing an efficient bidding strategy for simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA). SAA is a well-known mechanism for allocating spectrum to mobile networks operators and has been used for example to allocate 5G licenses in many countries. Although the rules are relatively simple, there is no known optimal bidding strategy for SAA. In a previous work, we proposed a Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search-based algorithm named <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula> that we extend here to an incomplete information framework. We consider and compare three determinization approaches of <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula>, and show how they are able to tackle four key strategic issues of SAA, namely, the exposure problem, the own price effect, the budget constraints and the eligibility management. Extensive numerical experiments on instances of realistic size and including an uncertain framework show that our extensions of <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula> outperform state-of-the-art algorithms by achieving higher expected utility while taking less risks.","PeriodicalId":55977,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Games","volume":"17 3","pages":"813-826"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bidding Efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Incomplete Information Using Monte Carlo Tree Search and Determinization\",\"authors\":\"Alexandre Pacaud;Aurelien Bechler;Marceau Coupechoux\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TG.2025.3552025\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this article, we tackle the problem of designing an efficient bidding strategy for simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA). SAA is a well-known mechanism for allocating spectrum to mobile networks operators and has been used for example to allocate 5G licenses in many countries. Although the rules are relatively simple, there is no known optimal bidding strategy for SAA. In a previous work, we proposed a Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search-based algorithm named <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula> that we extend here to an incomplete information framework. We consider and compare three determinization approaches of <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula>, and show how they are able to tackle four key strategic issues of SAA, namely, the exposure problem, the own price effect, the budget constraints and the eligibility management. Extensive numerical experiments on instances of realistic size and including an uncertain framework show that our extensions of <inline-formula><tex-math>$SMS^{\\\\alpha }$</tex-math></inline-formula> outperform state-of-the-art algorithms by achieving higher expected utility while taking less risks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":55977,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Games\",\"volume\":\"17 3\",\"pages\":\"813-826\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Games\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10930629/\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Games","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10930629/","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Bidding Efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Incomplete Information Using Monte Carlo Tree Search and Determinization
In this article, we tackle the problem of designing an efficient bidding strategy for simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA). SAA is a well-known mechanism for allocating spectrum to mobile networks operators and has been used for example to allocate 5G licenses in many countries. Although the rules are relatively simple, there is no known optimal bidding strategy for SAA. In a previous work, we proposed a Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search-based algorithm named $SMS^{\alpha }$ that we extend here to an incomplete information framework. We consider and compare three determinization approaches of $SMS^{\alpha }$, and show how they are able to tackle four key strategic issues of SAA, namely, the exposure problem, the own price effect, the budget constraints and the eligibility management. Extensive numerical experiments on instances of realistic size and including an uncertain framework show that our extensions of $SMS^{\alpha }$ outperform state-of-the-art algorithms by achieving higher expected utility while taking less risks.