与内生主张的竞争：冲突消散

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-09-09 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112572

Daniel Cardona , Marc Claveria-Mayol , Clara Ponsatí

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了两个代理之间的一维政策竞争，该竞争分两个步骤进行：首先，代理选择政策建议；然后，他们进行一场塔洛克竞赛，其中一个提案获胜。我们证明了存在一个独特的子博弈完美均衡（在非劣势策略中），其中两个竞争者平等地调节他们的主张。当竞争足够激烈时，提案就会向中心靠拢，冲突就会消散。预期收益随着竞争程度的增加而增加（直到上界），而总努力增加到最大值，然后减少。

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Contests with endogenous claims: Conflict dissipation

We examine a one-dimensional policy contest between two agents that takes place in two steps: first, agents choose policy proposals; then, they engage in a Tullock contest in which one of the proposals prevails. We show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (in undominated strategies), in which both contestants moderate their claims equally. When the contest is sufficiently competitive, proposals converge to the center, and conflict dissipates. Expected payoffs increase with the degree of competitiveness (up to an upper bound), while aggregate effort increases to a maximum and then decreases.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.