重新审视贿赂实验中的亲属和种族偏袒

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-08-30 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112569

Mahsa Akbari , Duman Bahrami-Rad , Erik O. Kimbrough

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们报告了Akbari等人（2020）的概念复制，他们研究了共同种族和亲属关系对实验性“贿赂游戏”行为的影响。在博弈中，参与者A可以向B行贿，而B可以通过低效地转移被动第三方C的资源来帮助A。我们复制了通过改变A、B和C的关系，我们可以实质性地调节A提供贿赂的意愿和B通过伤害C来回报贿赂的意愿。研究结果与亲属利他主义和种族偏袒理论一致。

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Revisiting kin and ethnic favoritism in the bribery experiment

We report a conceptual replication of Akbari et al. (2020), who study the impact of co-ethnicity and kinship on behavior in an experimental “bribery game”. In the game, player A can offer a bribe to B, who can help A by inefficiently transferring resources from passive third-party C. We replicate the finding that by varying the relatedness of A, B and C, we can substantially modulate the willingness of A to offer the bribe and the willingness of B to reciprocate the bribe by harming C. The findings are consistent with theories of kin altruism and ethnic favoritism.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.