战略（不一致）披露与老练投资者：来自对冲基金的证据

IF 6.3 2区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-09-03 DOI:10.1111/1475-679x.70013

YICHANG LIU, JOSHUA MADSEN, FRANK S. ZHOU

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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国证交会最近的规定要求，合格的对冲基金顾问必须向投资者披露其业务和运营情况。我们发现，与其他公共信息来源相比，这些披露中有40%忽略或淡化了有关顾问运营和投资风险的信息。具有这种“不一致性”的基金与可预测的较低基金绩效相关，但在资金流动、流量-绩效关系、所有权结构或管理费方面没有差异。这些结果与投资者受制于有限的战略思维是一致的，这使他们无法完全理解战略遗漏的影响。这反过来又有助于顾问成功地利用自由裁量权来淡化对业绩不利影响的信息。我们的研究结果表明，信息处理摩擦可以促进不披露，即使在拥有老练投资者的市场中也是如此。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Strategic (Inconsistent) Disclosures and Sophisticated Investors: Evidence from Hedge Funds

Recent SEC regulations require that qualified hedge fund advisers provide their investors with narrative disclosures of their business and operations. We find that 40% of these disclosures omit or de‐emphasize information regarding advisers' operational and investment risks when compared to other sources of public information. Funds with such “inconsistencies” are associated with predictably lower fund performance but do not differ in their fund flows, flow‐performance relation, ownership structure, or management fees. These results are consistent with investors being subject to limited strategic thinking, which prevents them from fully unraveling the implications of strategic omissions. This, in turn, contributes to advisers' successful use of discretion to de‐emphasize information with adverse performance implications. Our findings suggest that information processing frictions can facilitate nondisclosure, even in markets with sophisticated investors.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

7.80

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.