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引用次数: 0
摘要
Rokosz et al.(2025)运用Gawronski et al.(2017)的CNI模型分析了一个明显的结果,即在回答涉及对少数人伤害与对许多人伤害的牺牲性道德困境时,群体比个人更功利。他们得出结论,这种差异很大程度上是由于对后果的关注发生了变化,而对义务论道德规范的关注没有实质性影响,例如,义务论道德规范禁止伤害一个人,即使许多其他人会受益。我们表明,他们的结果可以用群体的第二效应来解释。他们减少了看似荒谬的反应,例如,当小组中的受试者选择行动时,即使规范和后果都倾向于不采取行动。当考虑到这种影响时,CNI模型得出的结论是,群体有两种影响,增加对后果的关注,减少对道义规范的关注。因此,小组讨论毕竟可以很好地减少义务论规范的牵引力,而义务论规范是功利主义判断的主要障碍。
Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one.
Rokosz et al. (2025) apply the CNI model of Gawronski et al. (2017) to analyze the apparent result that groups are more utilitarian than individuals in answering sacrificial moral dilemmas involving trade-offs of harm to a few against harm to many. They conclude that the difference is largely due to a change in attention to consequences, and no substantial effect on attention to deontological moral norms that (for example) prohibit harming a person even if many others would benefit. We show that their results can be explained by a second effect of groups. They reduce responses that appear nonsensical, e.g., when subjects in the group choose action even though both norms and consequences favor omission. When this effect is accounted for, the CNI model yields the conclusion that groups have both effects, increasing attention to consequences and reducing attention to deontological norms. Thus group discussion, after all, may well reduce the pull of deontological norms, which are the main impediment to utilitarian judgments.
期刊介绍:
Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.