互补投入、相互外包和供应商侵占

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Chrysovalantou Milliou, Konstantinos Serfes
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最终产品通常是使用多种互补投入生产的。我们研究了供应商侵占的激励和影响,并结合这一事实,并允许在被侵占的供应商和现任者之间相互外包的可能性。我们表明,当两家公司都出现在最终商品市场时,相互外包可以发生。我们还表明,与单一投入情况不同,当相互外包导致高批发价格时,供应商会避免侵犯,而这种侵犯可以通过产生投入销售而使在位者受益。最后,我们证明了非线性契约在入侵中起着重要的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Complementary Inputs, Mutual Outsourcing, and Supplier Encroachment

Complementary Inputs, Mutual Outsourcing, and Supplier Encroachment

Final goods are typically produced using multiple complementary inputs. We examine the incentives and implications of supplier encroachment incorporating this fact and allowing for the possibility of mutual outsourcing between the encroached supplier and the incumbent. We show that mutual outsourcing can occur when both firms are present in the final good market. We also show that, unlike the single input case, the supplier refrains from encroaching when mutual outsourcing results in high wholesale prices and that encroachment can benefit the incumbent by generating input sales. Finally, we show that nonlinear contracts play a significant role for encroachment.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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