为数字产品指定默认位置:竞争、监管和福利

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yongmin Chen, Marius Schwartz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了为搜索引擎等数字产品分配默认位置的替代方法。当两家竞争公司通过竞标争夺违约时,质量较高的公司通常会获胜,但由于利用消费者转换成本的货币化程度提高,其效用低于竞争对手。消费者转换成本的分布对竞价结果和福利结果起着至关重要的作用。矛盾的是,通过监管增加竞争对手的违约份额往往会提高利润,损害消费者,至少在短期内是这样。让消费者选择违约在短期内对他们有利,但对较弱的公司不利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Assigning Default Position for Digital Goods: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare

We analyze alternative ways to assign the default position for digital goods like search engines. When two competing firms vie for the default through bidding, the higher-quality firm typically wins but delivers lower utility than the rival due to heightened monetization from exploiting consumer switching costs. The distribution of consumer switching costs plays a crucial role in driving the bidding outcome and welfare results. Paradoxically, increasing via regulation the rival's default share tends to raise profit and harm consumers, at least in the short run. Letting consumers choose the default benefits them in the short run, but harms the weaker firm.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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