强制性收购规则下的收购锚定:来自新兴市场的证据

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Adrian Pop, Diana Pop
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文记录了在强制投标规则适用的大股东制度下,在定价和接受收购投标中存在的锚定偏见。我们对罗马尼亚公司控制权市场进行的分析表明,目标公司52周的高价和政府直接私有化的定价是出价溢价和结果的有力预测因素。投标决定还取决于少数股东认为的征用范围。我们的研究结果表明,加强资本市场纪律对于确保有效保护中小股东也很重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Anchoring in Takeovers Under Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence From an Emerging Market

This article documents the existence of an anchoring bias in the pricing and acceptance of takeover bids in a blockholder regime where the mandatory bid rule applies. Our analysis, performed on the Romanian market for corporate control, shows that the 52-week high price of the target and the pricing of direct privatisations conducted by the government are strong predictors of both bid premium and outcome. The tender decision depends also on the scope of expropriation perceived by minority shareholders. Our results suggest that stronger capital market discipline is also important for insuring an effective protection of minority shareholders.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
11.10%
发文量
32
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