{"title":"强制性收购规则下的收购锚定:来自新兴市场的证据","authors":"Adrian Pop, Diana Pop","doi":"10.1111/ecot.12451","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article documents the existence of an anchoring bias in the pricing and acceptance of takeover bids in a blockholder regime where the mandatory bid rule applies. Our analysis, performed on the Romanian market for corporate control, shows that the 52-week high price of the target and the pricing of direct privatisations conducted by the government are strong predictors of both bid premium and outcome. The tender decision depends also on the scope of expropriation perceived by minority shareholders. Our results suggest that stronger capital market discipline is also important for insuring an effective protection of minority shareholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":40265,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transition and Institutional Change","volume":"33 4","pages":"875-896"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecot.12451","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Anchoring in Takeovers Under Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence From an Emerging Market\",\"authors\":\"Adrian Pop, Diana Pop\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecot.12451\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This article documents the existence of an anchoring bias in the pricing and acceptance of takeover bids in a blockholder regime where the mandatory bid rule applies. Our analysis, performed on the Romanian market for corporate control, shows that the 52-week high price of the target and the pricing of direct privatisations conducted by the government are strong predictors of both bid premium and outcome. The tender decision depends also on the scope of expropriation perceived by minority shareholders. Our results suggest that stronger capital market discipline is also important for insuring an effective protection of minority shareholders.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":40265,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics of Transition and Institutional Change\",\"volume\":\"33 4\",\"pages\":\"875-896\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecot.12451\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics of Transition and Institutional Change\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecot.12451\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Transition and Institutional Change","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecot.12451","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Anchoring in Takeovers Under Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence From an Emerging Market
This article documents the existence of an anchoring bias in the pricing and acceptance of takeover bids in a blockholder regime where the mandatory bid rule applies. Our analysis, performed on the Romanian market for corporate control, shows that the 52-week high price of the target and the pricing of direct privatisations conducted by the government are strong predictors of both bid premium and outcome. The tender decision depends also on the scope of expropriation perceived by minority shareholders. Our results suggest that stronger capital market discipline is also important for insuring an effective protection of minority shareholders.