公司税对工资和议价能力的影响

IF 1.8 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Ji-Woong Moon
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引用次数: 0

摘要

工资会对租金分成制度下公司税的变化做出反应吗?如果是这样,工资对税收的弹性是否会随着工人议价能力的提高而增加?本文表明,与通常的直觉相反,这些问题没有一个普遍的答案。在纳什议价下,工资对比例公司税没有反应,除非有未征税的收入。在卡莱议价下,工资对税收有响应,但弹性与议价能力之间的关系是驼峰型的。这是因为较高的议价能力不仅增加了工资对给定税前利润的税收反应,而且放大了工资对税前利润的反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Incidence of corporate tax on wages and bargaining power
Do wages respond to changes in the corporate tax under rent-sharing? If so, does the elasticity of wages to tax increase with workers’ bargaining power? This paper shows that, contrary to common intuition, these questions do not have a universal answer. Under Nash bargaining, wages do not respond to proportional corporate tax unless there are untaxed revenues. Under Kalai bargaining, wages respond to tax, but the relationship between elasticity and bargaining power is hump-shaped. This occurs because higher bargaining power not only increases the wage response to tax given pre-tax profits, but also amplifies the wage response to pre-tax profits.
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来源期刊
Economics Letters
Economics Letters ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.00%
发文量
348
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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