信息协议

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-08-25 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Arseniy Samsonov

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们定义了一个（合作的）信息议价问题，其中几个代理必须就接收者的说服达成一致。议价集包括可以由信息结构产生的支付向量，分歧导致外生基准，可能涉及完全或没有信息。当偏好独立于国家时，我们描述了一个有利于所有主体的协议的存在。我们的描述得出的条件只取决于收益结构，但在某些情况下与先验信念无关。我们分析了两种情况下的帕累托有效信息结构：一种是选择环境，即接收者选择最佳代理；另一种是零售商平台与监管机构就消费者隐私监管进行讨价还价。

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Information agreements

We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.