{"title":"从蚊帐到火箭飞船:长期的效率与当下的忽视","authors":"Elizabeth C. Hupfer","doi":"10.1111/japp.70014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article I develop an objection to Longtermism – the view that concern for the long-term future is a moral imperative – that is often gestured at, but not fleshed out. I call this the Far-Future Priority Objection: Longtermism may entail significant resource reallocation and systemic neglect of the worst off today. I argue that Longtermism's endorsement of efficiency leads to repeated priority of distributive allocations to the far-future, so Longtermists must allow for moral concerns in addition to efficiency in order to mitigate the objection. The two most promising ways of doing this are to eschew strong versions of Longtermism in favor of weaker versions or incorporate deontic side-constraints. However, I argue that neither of these responses successfully undermines the Far-Future Priority Objection without abandoning fundamental tenets of Longtermism itself.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1190-1209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70014","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From Bednets to Rocket Ships: Efficiency in the Long-Term and Neglect for the Present\",\"authors\":\"Elizabeth C. Hupfer\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/japp.70014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In this article I develop an objection to Longtermism – the view that concern for the long-term future is a moral imperative – that is often gestured at, but not fleshed out. I call this the Far-Future Priority Objection: Longtermism may entail significant resource reallocation and systemic neglect of the worst off today. I argue that Longtermism's endorsement of efficiency leads to repeated priority of distributive allocations to the far-future, so Longtermists must allow for moral concerns in addition to efficiency in order to mitigate the objection. The two most promising ways of doing this are to eschew strong versions of Longtermism in favor of weaker versions or incorporate deontic side-constraints. However, I argue that neither of these responses successfully undermines the Far-Future Priority Objection without abandoning fundamental tenets of Longtermism itself.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47057,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Applied Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"42 4\",\"pages\":\"1190-1209\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70014\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Applied Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.70014\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.70014","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
From Bednets to Rocket Ships: Efficiency in the Long-Term and Neglect for the Present
In this article I develop an objection to Longtermism – the view that concern for the long-term future is a moral imperative – that is often gestured at, but not fleshed out. I call this the Far-Future Priority Objection: Longtermism may entail significant resource reallocation and systemic neglect of the worst off today. I argue that Longtermism's endorsement of efficiency leads to repeated priority of distributive allocations to the far-future, so Longtermists must allow for moral concerns in addition to efficiency in order to mitigate the objection. The two most promising ways of doing this are to eschew strong versions of Longtermism in favor of weaker versions or incorporate deontic side-constraints. However, I argue that neither of these responses successfully undermines the Far-Future Priority Objection without abandoning fundamental tenets of Longtermism itself.