The influence of heterogeneous investment on the evolution of trust in complex networks

Cooperation, despite its apparent contradiction with Darwinian competition, is widespread. Trust underpins socio-economic interactions and promotes cooperation, yet excessive trust can lead to losses. Furthermore, trust game studies indicate that heterogeneity, reputation, and punishment significantly enhance cooperation. However, traditional models often assume fixed investor investments, overlooking adaptive decision-making. To address this limitation, we develop a multi-agent trust game incorporating investment heterogeneity. In this framework, investors dynamically adjust their contributions based on collective trust levels, enabling high-trust groups to accumulate greater total assets. Simulation results demonstrate three key findings: (1) Heterogeneous investments accelerate the development of trust, expanding the populations of trustworthy trustees and investors while increasing total assets; (2) Increased investment heterogeneity facilitates high-trust equilibria even under strong social dilemmas; (3) The proportion of strategic individuals has a negligible impact on stabilized trust levels.