深度计算神经现象学:研究经验如何的方法论框架。

IF 4.3 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2025-08-05 eCollection Date: 2025-01-01 DOI:10.1093/nc/niaf016
Lars Sandved-Smith, Juan Diego Bogotá, Jakob Hohwy, Julian Kiverstein, Antoine Lutz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们论文的背景来自于20世纪90年代末由Francisco Varela发起的神经现象学(NPh)研究项目。Varela的工作假设是,为了取得成功,意识研究项目必须通过“相互约束”将经验结构的第一人称现象学描述与神经科学中的第三人称对应物联系起来,从而取得进展。利用贝叶斯力学,特别是深度参数主动推理,我们展示了现象学、计算、行为和生理词汇之间在认识论上有利的相互约束的潜力。具体来说,贝叶斯力学的双重信息几何有助于在特定条件下建立生活经验与其生理实例之间的生成通道。本文论证了这样一段的认识论必要性,以及在神经现象学经验方法中纳入训练有素的反思意识。特别是,它为科学家展示了通过整合参与者的认知见解而产生的增量解释收益,将焦点从经验的内容(即,在给定的实验设置中,受试者经历了什么)转移到经验的方式(即,在生活经验中允许一个有意义的世界出现在我们面前的意识活动)。由此产生的“元贝叶斯”框架(深度计算NPh)的解释力来自于由深度参数主动推理的形式主义实现的第一和第三人称视角之间的有序循环,其中参数深度指的是生成模型的属性,该属性可以形成关于其自身建模过程参数的信念。因此,这种计算形式主义有助于通过连接现象学描述和生理实例来理解意识,同时也强调了实验协议中训练有素的第一人称调查的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience.

Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience.

Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience.

Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience.

The context for our paper comes from the neurophenomenology (NPh) research programme initiated by Francisco Varela at the end of the 1990s. Varela's working hypothesis was that, to be successful, a consciousness research programme must progress by relating first-person phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their third-person counterparts in neuroscience through "mutual constraints". Leveraging Bayesian mechanics, in particular deep parametric active inference, we demonstrate the potential for epistemically advantageous mutual constraints between phenomenological, computational, behavioural, and physiological vocabularies. Specifically, the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics serves to establish, under certain conditions, generative passage between lived experience and its physiological instantiation. This paper argues for the epistemological necessity of such a passage and the inclusion of trained reflective awareness in neurophenomenological empirical approaches. In particular, it showcases incremental explanatory gains for the scientist that arise from incorporating the participants' epistemic insights, shifting the focus from the contents of experience (i.e. what a subject experiences in a given experimental set-up) to the how of experience (i.e. the activities of consciousness that allow for a meaningful world to appear to us as such in lived experience). The explanatory power of the resulting 'meta-Bayesian' framework, deep computational NPh, arises from the disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives enabled by the formalism of deep parametric active inference, where parametric depth refers to a property of generative models that can form beliefs about the parameters of their own modelling process. Hence, this computational formalism contributes to understanding consciousness by bridging phenomenological descriptions and physiological instantiations, whilst also highlighting the significance of trained first-person investigation in experimental protocols.

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来源期刊
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Neuroscience of Consciousness Psychology-Clinical Psychology
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
2.40%
发文量
16
审稿时长
19 weeks
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