Clarifying the metaphysics of pantheism to better assess the threat posed by the problem of evil identified by Nagasawa in The Problem of Evil for Atheists

In his clear, engaging, and highly original book, The Problem of Evil for Atheists (Nagasawa 2024), Yujin Nagasawa aims to defend two theses: “First, the problem of evil is (nearly) everyone’s problem, so everyone has to take it seriously. Second, the problem may well be a more formidable obstacle for naturalist atheists/non-theists than for supernaturalist theists” (p. 3). I focus my attention on the problem Nagasawa presents for pantheism. Nagasawa argues that a standard version of pantheism is vulnerable to what he christens the “divinity problem of evil.” I argue that the success of Nagasawa’s argument for the problem of evil for pantheism rests on controversial assumptions about the shared commitments of pantheistic proposals. I present a version of generic pantheism that is not vulnerable to the divinity problem of evil and I sketch a version of personal pantheism that has additional resources to respond to the problem of evil (and may do better than traditional theism).