竞争产业均衡中的契约制度与非竞争企业的研发合作

IF 2.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-13 DOI:10.1002/mde.4536

Travis Ng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在双头垄断模式中，一家公司可以选择与第三方进行研发合作。虽然合作可以加速创新，但第三方可能无意中将创新泄露给竞争对手。参与研发合作可以使竞争对手期望搭便车，这削弱了其研发支出的激励。如果信息泄露，公司可以对第三方采取法律行动。加强签约机构可以提高在这种情况下取得成功的可能性。在竞争性产业均衡中，强化契约制度有时只会增加研发合作、产业研发支出和创新率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium

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Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium

In a duopoly model, one firm has the option to collaborate in R&D with a third party. Although collaboration can expedite innovation, the third party may unintentionally leak the innovation to the rival firm. Engaging in R&D collaboration can make the rival firm anticipate a free ride, which weakens its incentives for R&D spending. The firm can take legal action against the third party in case of information leakage. Strengthening contracting institutions improves the likelihood of success in such cases. In a competitive industry equilibrium, strengthening contracting institutions only sometimes increases R&D collaboration, industry R&D spending, and the innovation rate.

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.