基于多智能体模拟的碳排放限额决策优化:考虑行为驱动因素

IF 8.4 2区 环境科学与生态学 Q1 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
Lihui Zhang, Jing Luo, Jinrong Zhu, Jie Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

碳交易市场在减少排放方面发挥着至关重要的作用,碳配额的初始分配是一个关键问题。随着许多新兴市场从自由分配机制转向拍卖机制,本研究在两种常用的拍卖机制下建立了基于多智能体模拟的碳配额决策优化模型。该模型同时考虑了政府的拍卖效率和企业的总碳合规成本,并纳入了影响企业竞价行为的行为因素:风险态度和信息反馈。本文进一步评估了保留价格、配额供应和二级市场交易价格等关键拍卖参数对拍卖效率、企业合规成本和碳减排结果的影响。采用多目标粒子群优化(MOPSO)算法求解该模型,利用TOPSIS方法从Pareto集合中选择理想解。主要结果包括:(1)风险偏好型企业更容易中标,这突出了投标态度的影响;(2)在可信社会网络下,随着企业社会网络密度的增加,拍卖信息反馈有助于提高拍卖效率,但过度的竞价调整可能导致趋同,降低效率;相反,虚假少报信息的存在会导致拍卖效率和企业总成本的下降,这在统一价格拍卖机制下表现得尤为明显。(3)提高拍卖底价和二级市场交易价格均能激励企业减少碳排放;(4)增加配额供给降低了企业的合规成本,但可能削弱企业的减排激励。本研究为政府设计碳配额拍卖机制提供了参考,以平衡拍卖效率和企业合规成本以及减排结果。为企业优化碳合规战略提供决策指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Carbon allowance decision optimization with multi-agent simulation: Incorporating behavioral drivers
Carbon trading markets play a vital role in reducing emissions, with the initial allocation of carbon allowances being a key issue. As many emerging markets shift from free allocation to auction mechanism, this study develops a carbon allowance decision optimization model based on multi-agent simulation under two commonly used auction mechanisms. The model considers both government's auction effectiveness and total companies' carbon compliance cost, and incorporates behavioral factors influencing corporate bidding behavior: risk attitude and information feedback. This paper further assesses how key auction parameters like reserve price, allowance supply, and secondary market transaction price affect auction efficiency, corporate compliance costs, and carbon reduction outcomes. The multi-objective particle swarm optimization (MOPSO) algorithm is used to solve the model, and the TOPSIS method helps select ideal solutions from the Pareto set. The main results include: (1) Risk-seeking companies are more likely to win bids, highlighting the impact of bidding attitudes; (2) Under trusted social network, as the density of corporate social networks increases, auction information feedback helps improve auction efficiency, but excessive bid adjustments may lead to convergence and reduce efficiency; In contrast, the existence of false underreporting information will lead to a decrease in auction efficiency and total enterprise costs, which is particularly evident under the uniform-price auction mechanism. (3) The increase in auction reserve price and secondary market transaction price can both encourage companies to reduce carbon emissions; (4) Increasing allowance supply reduces compliance costs but may weaken companies' emission reduction incentives. This study provides insights for governments in designing carbon allowance auction mechanisms that balance auction efficiency and corporate compliance costs, as well as emission reduction outcomes. It also offers decision-making guidance for enterprises in optimizing carbon compliance strategies.
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来源期刊
Journal of Environmental Management
Journal of Environmental Management 环境科学-环境科学
CiteScore
13.70
自引率
5.70%
发文量
2477
审稿时长
84 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Management is a journal for the publication of peer reviewed, original research for all aspects of management and the managed use of the environment, both natural and man-made.Critical review articles are also welcome; submission of these is strongly encouraged.
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