专业化借贷的信息化定价

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-23 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104135

Kristian Blickle , Zhiguo He , Jing Huang , Cecilia Parlatore

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了非对称信息银行（一个专业银行和一个非专业银行）之间的竞争如何影响贷款价格。两家银行都有关于借款人质量的“一般”信号，它们用这些信号来筛选贷款。专业银行还可以获得“专业”信号，并以此为基础进行贷款定价。这种基于私人信息的定价使得专业银行更积极地竞标，减轻了赋予其垄断权力的信息租金效应。我们的研究结果解释了为什么专业贷款机构的贷款具有较低的利率和较好的事后表现。支持性的经验证据强调了专业化信息在塑造信贷市场结果中的作用。

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Information-based pricing in specialized lending

We study how competition between asymmetrically informed banks, one specialized and one nonspecialized, affects loan prices. Both banks possess “general” signals regarding the borrower’s quality, which they use to screen loans. The specialized bank also has access to a “specialized” signal on which it bases its loan pricing. This private information-based pricing makes the specialized bank bid more aggressively, mitigating the informational rent effect that gives it monopolistic power. Our findings explain why loans from specialized lenders feature lower interest rates and better ex post performance. Supporting empirical evidence emphasizes the role of specialized information in shaping credit market outcomes.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.