内河航运采用电动船的最优补贴方案

IF 6.8 1区工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS

Transportation Research Part A-Policy and Practice Pub Date : 2025-07-19 DOI:10.1016/j.tra.2025.104591

Ziyu Cui , Xiaowen Fu , Xiangru Wu , Kun Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了推进内河航运的船队电气化，各国政府正在评估各种补贴政策，以鼓励采用电动船舶。本文提出了一个博弈论模型，用于设计包含政府、港口经营者、航运公司和托运人等主要利益相关者之间相互作用的最优补贴方案。对三种被广泛采用的补贴方案进行了分析建模和基准测试：充电站投资补贴、电动船购买补贴和充电费补贴。结果表明，三种补贴方案均提高了充电站投资水平、托运人剩余、港口和航运公司利润以及整体社会福利。同时，这些方案的有效性受到充电效率水平的显著影响。具体而言，在充电效率较低的情况下，运营和购买补贴方案会带来更高的社会福利。相反，在某些情况下，对船舶购买的直接补贴可能导致充电站投资高于对充电站的直接补贴。此外，更高的充电效率通常有利于充电站补贴计划，因为减少等待时间可以提高系统效率，增加需求，并增强社会福利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Optimal subsidy scheme for electric ship adoption in inland shipping

To advance fleet electrification in inland waterway shipping, governments are evaluating various subsidy policies to encourage the adoption of electric ships. This paper presents a game-theoretical model for designing the optimal subsidy scheme that incorporates the interactions among key stakeholders, including the government, port operator, shipping company, and shipper. Three widely adopted subsidy schemes are analytically modeled and benchmarked: subsidies for charging station investment, electric ship purchases, and charging fees. The results indicate that all three subsidy schemes increase the level of investment in charging stations, shipper surplus, port and shipping company profits, and overall social welfare. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of these schemes is significantly influenced by charging efficiency levels. Specifically, under low charging efficiency, operational and purchase subsidy schemes lead to higher social welfare. Conversely, direct subsidies for ship purchases may result in higher investment in charging stations than direct subsidies for charging stations in certain cases. Moreover, higher charging efficiency generally favors charging station subsidy schemes because reduced waiting times improve system efficiency, increase demand, and enhance social welfare.

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来源期刊

Transportation Research Part A-Policy and Practice 工程技术-运输科技

CiteScore

13.20

自引率

7.80%

发文量

257

审稿时长

9.8 months

期刊介绍： Transportation Research: Part A contains papers of general interest in all passenger and freight transportation modes: policy analysis, formulation and evaluation; planning; interaction with the political, socioeconomic and physical environment; design, management and evaluation of transportation systems. Topics are approached from any discipline or perspective: economics, engineering, sociology, psychology, etc. Case studies, survey and expository papers are included, as are articles which contribute to unification of the field, or to an understanding of the comparative aspects of different systems. Papers which assess the scope for technological innovation within a social or political framework are also published. The journal is international, and places equal emphasis on the problems of industrialized and non-industrialized regions. Part A''s aims and scope are complementary to Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies and Part D: Transport and Environment. Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. The complete set forms the most cohesive and comprehensive reference of current research in transportation science.