企业价值创造与采购合同授予

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Stephen P. Ferris, Reza Houston, Blake Rayfield
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了联邦采购合同如何影响股东价值,揭示了初始奖励规模与投资者反应之间一致的正相关关系。我们发现合同甜心指数对投资者反应的重大影响,无投标(唯一来源)合同、国防合同、服务合同和免除成本或价格报告要求的合同吸引了更强的投资者兴趣。值得注意的是,我们观察到围绕奖励公告的重大信息泄露影响了投资者的行为。通过差异分析,我们的研究结果表明,与其他大型政府合同相比,长期国防合同导致更大的股本回报率增长,作为对匹配公司样本的评估。此外,我们的研究强调,集中度高的行业和涉及独特商品和服务的行业的合同往往更有利可图,这为参与联邦采购战略的投资者和政策制定者提供了重要的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corporate Value Creation and the Award of Procurement Contracts

This study explores how federal procurement contracts influence shareholder value, revealing a consistent positive correlation between the size of the initial award and investor reactions. We uncover a significant impact of the contract's Sweetheart Index on investor responses, with no-bid (sole source) contracts, defense contracts, service contracts, and contracts exempt from cost or price reporting requirements attracting stronger investor interest. Notably, we observe significant information leakage around award announcements that affects investor behavior. Through difference-in-difference analysis, our findings show that long-term defense contracts lead to a greater increase in return on equity compared to other large government contracts, as assessed against a matched sample of firms. Additionally, our study highlights that contracts in industries with high concentration and those involving unique goods and services tend to be more lucrative, providing critical insights for investors and policymakers engaged in federal procurement strategies.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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