测试“隔离”的心智理论的元表征:我们是否被他人的错误信念所偏见?

IF 3.1 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Steven Samuel , Robert Lurz , Daizi Davies , Harry Axtell , Sarah K. Salo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

心理理论的一个重要组成部分是理解他人信仰(对或错)的能力。可以说,最广泛持有的观点是,这是通过一个分离的信念-表征过程(例如,元表征,另一个代理对世界有一个信念,而这个信念是一个不共享的)来执行的。标准的信念表征理论假定在一个人对物理环境的一阶表征和对另一个人的精神状态的二阶表征之间存在分离,以防止后者感染前者。另一个过程是参与信念模拟(例如,想象地采用另一个主体对世界的信念),与标准的信念表征相反,它假设自己和另一个主体共享的心理状态是对应的,并预测另一个主体的信念对自己一阶表征和自我中心行为的影响。在三个研究中的前两个中,一个参与者和一个代理人观看一个埋在连续空间(沙盒)中的物体。然后,参与者观看相同的物体从第一个位置移动到一个新的位置。当参与者被要求寻找物体时,当代理人错误地认为物体在那里时,他们表现出对第一个位置的偏见,但当代理人像参与者一样知道物体在新位置时,他们就不会这样做。考虑到这种偏见的强度可能受到参与者对物体真实位置的了解的限制,在第三个也是最后一个研究中,我们隐藏了物体的运动,这样参与者就不知道它的真实位置。我们还招募了更多的参与者来增加统计能力。与预期相反,现在没有证据表明存在信念感染。总的来说,这些结果更符合(人类)成年人对他人信念状态的理解的信念表征解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Testing “quarantined” metarepresentational accounts of Theory of Mind: Are we biased by others' false beliefs?
An important component of Theory of Mind is the ability to understand the beliefs (true or false) of others. Arguably the most widely-held view is that this is performed by a detached belief-representation process (e.g., metarepresenting that another agent has a belief about the world which one does not share). The standard belief-representation account posits a separation between one's own first-order representations of the physical environment and one's second-order representations of another agent's mental states, preventing the latter from infecting the former. An alternative process is engaged belief-simulation (e.g., imaginatively adopting another agent's belief about the world) which, in contrast to standard belief-representation, posits a correspondence in the mental states shared by oneself and another agent and predicts an influence of the other agent's beliefs on one's own first-order representations and egocentric actions. In the first two of three studies, a participant and an agent watched an object buried in a continuous space (sandbox). The participant then watched the same object moved from the first location to a new location. When participants were asked to search for the object, they demonstrated a bias towards the first location when the agent falsely believed the object to be there but not when the agent knew, like the participant, that the object was in the new location. Reasoning that the strength of this bias may have been limited by participants' knowledge of the object's true whereabouts, in a third and final study we hid the movement of the object so that participants did not know its true location. We also recruited a greater number of participants to increase statistical power. Contrary to expectations, there was now no evidence of belief infection. Overall, these results are more consistent with a belief-representation account for (human) adults' understanding of others' belief states.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
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