削减有争议行业的资金:有针对性的信贷配给能扼杀公司吗?

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Kunal Sachdeva , André F. Silva , Pablo Slutzky , Billy Y. Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了银行定向信贷配给对可能产生负外部性的企业的影响。我们利用了美国司法部的一项名为“瓶颈行动”的倡议,该倡议迫使银行限制与有争议行业的公司的关系。利用监管贷款水平的数据,我们表明,目标银行减少了贷款,并终止了与受影响企业的关系。然而,这些公司中的大多数在类似条件下完全通过非目标银行替代信贷。总体而言,我们发现受影响企业的业绩和投资没有显著变化,这表明有针对性的信贷配给在促进变革方面普遍无效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Defunding controversial industries: Can targeted credit rationing choke firms?
This paper examines the effects of targeted credit rationing by banks on firms likely to generate negative externalities. We exploit an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice, labeled Operation Choke Point, which compelled banks to limit relationships with firms in controversial industries. Using supervisory loan-level data, we show that, as intended, targeted banks reduced lending and terminated relationships with affected firms. However, most of these firms fully substituted credit through nontargeted banks under similar terms. Overall, we find no significant shifts in the performance and investment of affected firms, suggesting that targeted credit rationing is widely ineffective in promoting change.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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