无序成本不对称的全报酬竞争：一个实验研究

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-14 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107131

Yohanes E. Riyanto , Siqiang Yang , Feng Zhu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一个实验室实验，研究在参与者具有不同成本函数和优势区域的情况下的竞赛设计和参赛者行为，这是一个相对未被探索的主题。利用基于西格尔（2009,2010）模型的实验室实验，我们发现投标策略和收益在很大程度上遵循理论预测。最弱的竞争者由于其在低出价地区的成本优势，往往会过度参与。增加奖品或增加奖品价值有利于更强大的参与者，并增加设计师的收益。虽然减少参赛者的数量也有利于更强大的参与者，但设计师的收益也会随之减少。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study

This paper presents a laboratory experiment investigating contest design and contestant behavior in settings where participants have different cost functions and regions of advantage, a topic that is relatively unexplored. Utilizing lab experiments based on Siegel’s (2009, 2010) models, we discover that bidding strategies and payoffs largely follow theoretical predictions. The weakest contestants tend to over-participate due to their cost advantage in low-bid regions. Adding a prize or increasing the prize value benefits stronger participants and increases the designer’s revenue. While decreasing the number of contestants also favors stronger participants, the designer’s revenue decrease in response.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.