管理层持股有回报:中国控股股东股权质押与企业创新质量

IF 5.3 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Bei Liu , Yuan Wang , Lufei Yang , Huabin Bian
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在中国,上市公司具有股权高度集中的特点,控股股东在公司决策中起着决定性的作用。本文以2010 - 2020年a股上市公司为研究对象,考察了控股股东股权质押对企业创新质量的影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押显著抑制了企业创新质量,主要通过降低研发投资强度来实现。此外,管理层所有权减轻了这种负面影响,在首席执行官和董事长角色分离的公司中具有更强的调节作用。这种抑制效应在外部治理较弱的公司中更为明显,如审计质量较低和分析师覆盖率较低。研究结果突出了内部治理和外部治理在企业创新中的相互作用,为政策制定者和投资者减轻股权质押风险提供了参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Managerial ownership pays off: Controlling shareholders' share pledging and corporate innovation quality in China
In China, listed companies are characterized by high equity concentration, where controlling shareholders play a decisive role in corporate decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on corporate innovation quality using A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2020. The findings reveal that equity pledging by controlling shareholders significantly suppresses corporate innovation quality, primarily through a reduction in R&D investment intensity. Furthermore, managerial ownership mitigates this negative effect, with a stronger moderating role in firms where the CEO and chairman roles are separated. The suppression effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker external governance, such as lower audit quality and less analyst coverage. The results highlight the interplay between internal and external governance in corporate innovation, offering insights for policymakers and investors on mitigating the risks of share pledging.
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来源期刊
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
6.50%
发文量
157
期刊介绍: The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.
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