{"title":"管理层持股有回报:中国控股股东股权质押与企业创新质量","authors":"Bei Liu , Yuan Wang , Lufei Yang , Huabin Bian","doi":"10.1016/j.pacfin.2025.102856","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In China, listed companies are characterized by high equity concentration, where controlling shareholders play a decisive role in corporate decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on corporate innovation quality using A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2020. The findings reveal that equity pledging by controlling shareholders significantly suppresses corporate innovation quality, primarily through a reduction in R&D investment intensity. Furthermore, managerial ownership mitigates this negative effect, with a stronger moderating role in firms where the CEO and chairman roles are separated. The suppression effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker external governance, such as lower audit quality and less analyst coverage. The results highlight the interplay between internal and external governance in corporate innovation, offering insights for policymakers and investors on mitigating the risks of share pledging.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48074,"journal":{"name":"Pacific-Basin Finance Journal","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102856"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial ownership pays off: Controlling shareholders' share pledging and corporate innovation quality in China\",\"authors\":\"Bei Liu , Yuan Wang , Lufei Yang , Huabin Bian\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.pacfin.2025.102856\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>In China, listed companies are characterized by high equity concentration, where controlling shareholders play a decisive role in corporate decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on corporate innovation quality using A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2020. The findings reveal that equity pledging by controlling shareholders significantly suppresses corporate innovation quality, primarily through a reduction in R&D investment intensity. Furthermore, managerial ownership mitigates this negative effect, with a stronger moderating role in firms where the CEO and chairman roles are separated. The suppression effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker external governance, such as lower audit quality and less analyst coverage. The results highlight the interplay between internal and external governance in corporate innovation, offering insights for policymakers and investors on mitigating the risks of share pledging.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48074,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Pacific-Basin Finance Journal\",\"volume\":\"93 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102856\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Pacific-Basin Finance Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X25001933\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Pacific-Basin Finance Journal","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X25001933","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Managerial ownership pays off: Controlling shareholders' share pledging and corporate innovation quality in China
In China, listed companies are characterized by high equity concentration, where controlling shareholders play a decisive role in corporate decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on corporate innovation quality using A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2020. The findings reveal that equity pledging by controlling shareholders significantly suppresses corporate innovation quality, primarily through a reduction in R&D investment intensity. Furthermore, managerial ownership mitigates this negative effect, with a stronger moderating role in firms where the CEO and chairman roles are separated. The suppression effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker external governance, such as lower audit quality and less analyst coverage. The results highlight the interplay between internal and external governance in corporate innovation, offering insights for policymakers and investors on mitigating the risks of share pledging.
期刊介绍:
The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.