Wangbo Gao , Zicheng Zhang , Pinglin He , Xuewu Wang
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From accountability to transparency: The role of collective litigation in enhancing corporate information disclosure
Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design and a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2017 to 2023, we examine whether the introduction of a collective litigation system improves corporate information disclosure. Exploiting the staggered implementation of the system and validating the parallel trends assumption, we find that collective litigation significantly enhances disclosure quality. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and placebo tests. Mechanism analyses suggest that the effect is achieved primarily through a deterrence channel and enhanced external governance. Importantly, the effectiveness of the litigation regime is amplified when supported by a strong legal environment and complementary regulatory guidance. However, risk-shifting behavior by firms weakens this effect. Improvements in disclosure quality are also associated with broader market outcomes, including changes in audit pricing, investor response, and perceived default risk. Collectively, our results highlight the role of legal enforcement in shaping disclosure practices in emerging markets.
期刊介绍:
The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.